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THE LESSON OF THE 2011 NFL AND NBA LOCKOUTS: 
WHY COURTS SHOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY 
RECOGNIZE PLAYERS’ UNION DISCLAIMERS OF 
REPRESENTATION 
Ross Siler 
Abstract: The NFL and NBA lockouts of 2011 challenged the limits of the balance courts 
have struck between collective bargaining protections and antitrust liability. In each lockout, 
the respective players’ union argued that the bargaining relationship with team owners ended 
once the union disclaimed interest in continuing as its players’ bargaining representative. The 
players further argued that with the bargaining relationship terminated, the nonstatutory labor 
exemption no longer shielded owners from antitrust liability for their cooperative agreements 
and activity. Ultimately, both lockouts settled without courts deciding whether a disclaimer 
of representation marks what the Supreme Court has described as an “extreme outer 
boundary” that is “sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances” from the bargaining 
process such that the nonstatutory labor exemption might no longer protect employers from 
antitrust liability. This Comment argues that courts should be wary of recognizing 
disclaimers as terminating the exemption in the wake of the 2011 lockouts. Instead, courts 
should extend the exemption for a reasonable period following disclaimer. By doing so, 
courts would reduce the possibility of introducing instability and uncertainty in the 
bargaining process, which the Court has recognized in the past as a significant concern. Such 
an extension also would help separate deserving antitrust claims from mere bargaining tactics 
while allowing the economic pressures facing both sides to shape their ultimate agreement. 
INTRODUCTION 
For professional football and basketball fans, 2011 will be 
remembered as the “Year of the Lockout.” After collective bargaining 
agreements (CBAs) in the National Football League (NFL) and National 
Basketball Association (NBA) expired, team owners in each league 
locked out their players for months until new CBAs could be reached.1 
With hundreds of millions of dollars at stake in these bitter labor 
                                                     
1. See Complaint at 1, Anthony v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, No. C11-05525 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 
2011) [hereinafter Anthony Complaint]; Complaint at 1, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. 
Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011) (No. 11CV00639) [hereinafter Brady Complaint]; Brief for Major 
League Baseball Players’ Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 14, Brady v. 
Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898), 2011 WL 2129898 (“A 
‘lockout’ occurs when an owner temporarily stops ‘furnishing . . . work to employees in an effort to 
get for the employer more desirable terms’ and a ‘fundamental purpose underlying economic 
lockouts is that the union may end the lockout and return the employees to work by agreeing to the 
employer’s demands.’”) (quoting 2 JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1638, 
1672 (5th ed. 2006)). 
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battles, players in both leagues followed the same legal game plan—
dissolving their unions and accusing the owners of antitrust violations.2 
The players’ union in each league—the National Football League 
Players Association (NFLPA) and National Basketball Players 
Association (NBPA)—disclaimed its interest in continuing to serve as its 
respective players’ bargaining representative.3 Although the disclaimers 
were not formal decertifications, the players asserted that the disclaimers 
dissolved their unions in identical fashion.4 Accordingly, the players 
said, labor law no longer shielded the owners from antitrust litigation.5 
Following the disclaimers, players in each league filed class-action 
antitrust suits, claiming that the owners had engaged in group boycotts 
and attempted price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act.6 The players 
argued that by dissolving their unions, they had abandoned collective 
bargaining and the owners were now liable under antitrust law.7 The 
players could have achieved the same result by decertifying their unions, 
but decertification brings additional logistical and legal consequences.8 
By disclaiming, the players dissolved their unions through a less 
demanding and more immediate process, but one with less certainty in 
litigation.9 The resulting legal battles in both leagues involved some of 
the biggest stars in each sport, as well as several of the country’s most 
prominent lawyers.10 
                                                     
2. See Howard Beck, After a Stagnant 12 Months, the N.B.A. Faces its Own Labor Countdown, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, at B11. Tulane sports law professor Gabe Feldman said: “I think the 
N.B.A. and N.B.P.A. can sort of go to school on what’s happening right now” in the NFL. Id. He 
also said, “There are certainly different pressure points for each, but the general strategy we’re 
seeing could be the same.” Id. 
3. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 4–5; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
4. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 5, 21–22; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. A 
decertification is a formal election concerning a union’s status as an employees’ bargaining 
representative. See infra Part III.  
5. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 5, 21–22; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. 
6. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 5, 17–18; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 3, 39–40. 
The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), declares that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade or commerce is illegal. 
7. Brady Complaint supra note 1, at 3, 27–30; Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. See infra Part III. 
10. Three of the plaintiffs in the NFL players’ suit were Super Bowl-winning quarterbacks Tom 
Brady, Peyton Manning, and Drew Brees. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 5–6, 31–32; 
Clifton Brown, End of the Rainbow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007, at D1. Two of the plaintiffs in the 
NBA players’ suit were star players Carmelo Anthony and Kevin Durant. See Anthony Complaint, 
supra note 1, at 8, 19; Jonathan Abrams, This is the Way Durant Signs: Not with a Bang but on 
Twitter, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2010, at B13. Among the lawyers who represented the players and 
owners were David Boies, Paul Clement and Theodore Olson. See Judy Battista, N.F.L. Hires 
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The biggest difference between each lockout was the timing of each 
union’s disclaimer. The NFLPA disclaimed representation the day 
before the CBA was set to expire; its players filed suit concurrently as 
the football owners imposed a lockout.11 Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit 
rejected a U.S. District Court judge’s injunction of the lockout.12 
However, the Eighth Circuit offered no opinion on the merits of the 
players’ antitrust claims or the effectiveness of the disclaimer of 
representation.13 The Eighth Circuit held only that the District Court 
could not enjoin the lockout under the Norris-LaGuardia Act,14 which 
restricts courts from issuing injunctions in cases involving or growing 
out of a labor dispute.15 
By contrast, the locked-out NBA players attempted to negotiate a new 
CBA with owners for four-and-a-half months after their CBA expired 
before the NBPA disclaimed representation.16 The basketball players 
filed suit the following day.17 By then, NBA Commissioner David Stern 
already had canceled the season’s first month.18 In the end, the NBA 
players never progressed beyond the filing stage in their suit.19 With the 
league facing the possibility of a lost season, the owners and players 
settled the suit and reached agreement on a new CBA two weeks after 
the NBPA’s disclaimer.20 
Both unions’ suits challenged the balance that courts have attempted 
to strike in labor jurisprudence between laws encouraging collective 
bargaining and laws discouraging anti-competitive behavior by either 
side. To strike this balance, courts have endorsed a so-called 
nonstatutory labor exemption, which allows employers some freedom to 
                                                     
Attorneys for Suit Against Players, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
03/13/sports/football/13boies.html; Judy Battista, Headed Back to Court, N.F.L. May Gain Clarity, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2011, at B13; Ken Belson, Lawyer for N.F.L. in Lockout Joins Players in 
N.B.A. Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at B14.  
11. Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
12. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 2011). 
13. Id. at 682. 
14. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
15. Brady, 644 F.3d at 680–82.  
16. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 3–4; Howard Beck, N.B.A. Season in Peril as Players 
Reject Offer and Disband Union, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at A1. 
17. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
18. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Talks Stall, and More Games Are Canceled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2011, 
at D4. 
19. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Reaches Tentative Deal to Save Season, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2011, at 
A1. 
20. Id. 
15 - Siler Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2013  7:01 PM 
284 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:281 
 
act in cooperation without violating antitrust laws.21 Even in cases where 
employers and unions have taken entrenched positions, courts have 
refused to expose employers to antitrust liability given what they cite as 
a congressional preference for collective bargaining—even strained and 
stalled bargaining.22 In its most significant ruling on the subject, the 
Supreme Court in 1996 held in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.23 that NFL 
owners could impose salary restrictions for a new subclass of players 
after bargaining to an impasse with the NFLPA on the subject.24 In an 8-
1 decision, the Court sided with the owners, expressing concern about 
the potentially destabilizing effect that antitrust liability could have on 
collective bargaining in such circumstances.25 
However, the Court held that such protection from antitrust liability 
does not continue indefinitely for employers negotiating with a union.26 
The Court held that “an agreement among employers could be 
sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective-
bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not 
significantly interfere with that process.”27 The Court suggested that the 
nonstatutory labor exemption would last until the collapse of the 
collective bargaining relationship.28 But the Court expressly declined to 
define the limits where the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer 
would shield an employer from antitrust liability.29 
After dissolving their unions by disclaiming representation in 2011, 
the NFL and NBA players argued that the collective bargaining 
relationship had ended and therefore the nonstatutory labor exemption 
no longer protected the owners from antitrust liability.30 As support, the 
players looked to Brown, in which the Court signaled that the formal 
decertification of a union would mark the collapse of collective 
bargaining.31 However, the 2011 lockouts failed to resolve several 
                                                     
21. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996). 
22. Id. at 249–50. 
23. 518 U.S. 231. 
24. Id. at 233–34. 
25. Id. at 241–42. 
26. Id. at 250. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. (The Court endorsed the “suggest[ion] that exemption lasts until collapse of the collective-
bargaining relationship, as evidenced by decertification of the union.”). 
29. Id. (“We need not decide in this case whether, or where, within these extreme outer 
boundaries to draw that line.”). 
30. Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 3, 30; Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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significant questions based on the players’ contention. Does a union’s 
disclaimer of representation suffice as a collapse of the collective 
bargaining relationship? Is a disclaimer of representation “sufficiently 
distant in time and in circumstances” from the bargaining process such 
that the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer should shield employers 
from antitrust liability?32 Does a disclaimer of representation amount to 
one of the “extreme outer boundaries” noted in Brown where the line 
between collective-bargaining protections and antitrust liability should 
be drawn?33 Although a U.S. District Court judge issued a favorable 
ruling for the NFL players, the Eighth Circuit reached no conclusion, 
leaving these questions unanswered.34 
Although the 2011 lockouts had particular importance in the sports 
world, this Comment argues that courts should be wary of accepting 
disclaimers of representation as extinguishing the nonstatutory labor 
exemption. Courts should either defer to the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) in determining whether a disclaimer amounts to a good-
faith termination of collective bargaining, or extend antitrust protection 
to employers for a reasonable period following a union’s disclaimer. The 
destabilizing effect on collective bargaining that concerned the Court in 
Brown is just as apparent when a union’s unilateral and instantaneous 
disclaimer can expose employers to antitrust liability. Much as the NFL 
owners argued in 2011, Brown represents a “fundamental recognition 
that the labor laws cannot function unless collective bargaining is given 
significant room to operate, even after one side unilaterally asserts that 
the relationship is over.”35 A union’s instantaneous renunciation of 
collective bargaining through a disclaimer—as opposed to a formal 
decertification—threatens the collective bargaining and antitrust balance 
that courts have attempted to strike. 
Part I of this Comment offers background about both leagues’ 
lockouts in 2011. Parts II, III and IV examine the background of the 
nonstatutory labor exemption, the Supreme Court’s Brown decision, and 
the differences between disclaimers and decertification of unions 
respectively. Part V recounts the NFL players’ 1989 and 1991 court 
battles that served as precedent for the 2011 lockouts. Part VI explores 
the NFL players’ suit in 2011 and the subsequent victories and defeats in 
court. Part VII addresses the NBA players’ suit in 2011 and the quick 
                                                     
32. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250. 
33. Id. 
34. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 682 (8th Cir. 2011). 
35. See Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 35, Brady v. 
Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011) (No. 11CV00639). 
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resolution that followed out of court. Finally, Part VIII argues that future 
courts faced with a players’ union’s disclaimer of representation, 
followed by an antitrust suit, should extend nonstatutory labor 
exemption protections for a reasonable period following such disclaimer. 
I.  BOTH THE NFL AND NBA ENDURED MONTHS-LONG 
LOCKOUTS IN 2011 OVER THE SPLIT OF REVENUES IN 
EACH LEAGUE 
Two of the world’s most prominent professional sports leagues, the 
NFL and NBA are composed of dozens of separately owned and 
independently operated teams—thirty-two teams in the NFL and thirty 
teams in the NBA.36 A CBA governs the labor relationship in each 
league—in particular, player-salary rules and restrictions—and is the 
product of negotiations between the owners and players.37 The NFL and 
NBA players traditionally have been represented by unions, who in turn 
bargain with the owners regarding terms of the CBA.38 But the labor 
relationship in both leagues broke down in 2011 as players and owners 
battled over the future split of revenues in their respective new CBAs.39 
With no agreement, the owners in each league locked out the players and 
effectively suspended operations.40 
During the lockouts, contact between teams and players ceased—
players could not train at team facilities, and teams could not sign 
players to contracts.41 The NBA went so far as to remove all images of 
active players from its website.42 The NFL lockout was its first since 
1987; the NBA lockout was its first since 1999.43 And with their 
respective lockouts overlapping in July 2011, the two leagues made 
sports history: for only the second time, two of the four major 
                                                     
36. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 6–7; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 7–9.  
37. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 3; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 19–21. 
38. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 3; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 19–21. 
39. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 19–22, Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (No. 11CV00639); 
Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 4. 
40. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 23; Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. 
41. See Judy Battista, End of N.F.L. Lockout is Imminent, if Elusive, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2011, 
at D5; Howard Beck & Richard Sandomir, Lockout is to Be Partially Lifted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 
2011, at B18; Howard Fendrich, Lockout Leaves NFL in Limbo After Talks Break Off, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Mar. 12, 2011, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=6205936. 
42. See Howard Beck, Players Are Locked Out of N.B.A.’s Web Site, Too, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 
2011, at D6. 
43. See Judy Battista, As N.F.L. Talks Fail, ‘11 Season Seems in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2011, at A1; Howard Beck, Stalemate in Labor Talks Forces N.B.A. to Shut Down, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 1, 2011, at B9. 
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professional sports leagues shut down simultaneously due to labor 
strife.44 
Owners in both leagues sought an increased percentage of revenues 
they share with players.45 While the NFL owners did not dispute their 
teams’ profitability under the expired CBA, the NBA claimed that as 
many as twenty-two of its thirty teams lost more than $300 million 
combined during the previous season.46 
The two lockouts stretched for months.47 The NFL endured a 136-day 
lockout before owners and players agreed to a ten-year CBA—the 
longest sports labor deal in history.48 The lone scheduling casualty was 
the cancellation of an annual preseason game.49 Otherwise, the owners 
and players reached agreement in time for teams to hold training camps 
and play full schedules.50 By contrast, the NBA’s 149-day lockout also 
produced a new CBA, but not in time to salvage a full season of 
games.51 The season began nearly eight weeks late on December 25, 
with the lost games costing both the owners and players an estimated 
$400 million each.52 Instead of the usual eighty-two games, each team 
played only sixty-six games in the 2011–12 season.53 
                                                     
44. Brian Mahoney, NBA Lockout Begins As Sides Fail to Reach New Deal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
July 1, 2011, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=6723645. The four major 
professional sports leagues are Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, the 
National Football League, and the National Hockey League. The other time two of the four leagues 
shut down simultaneously came in 1994 when Major League Baseball players went on strike and 
National Hockey League owners locked out players. Id. Baseball’s work stoppage that year 
ultimately led to the cancellation of the World Series. Id. 
45. See Joe Drape, Lockout is Strategy With Risks For Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, at 
SP1; Beck, supra note 43. The NFL owners wanted $1 billion in revenues previously shared with 
players. See Drape, supra. The owners also wanted to lengthen the season from sixteen to eighteen 
games. Id. 
46. See Battista, supra note 43; Beck, supra note 43. According to Forbes magazine, seventeen of 
thirty NBA teams lost money the previous season. See Beck, supra notes 2, 43. 
47. See Beck, supra note 19 (NBA); Jarrett Bell, Done Deal, NFL on Fast Track, USA TODAY, 
July 26, 2011, at 1C (NFL). 
48. See Bell, supra note 47, at 1C. 
49. See Judy Battista, As the Lockout Ends, the Scrambling Begins, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2011, at 
B10. The NFL owners ratified the proposal 31-0 and player representatives from the thirty teams 
unanimously approved the deal on July 25, 2011. Id. The first NFL training camps opened two days 
later. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. See Beck, supra note 19. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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II.  IF NOT FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
AND THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION, TEAM 
OWNERS COULD FACE ANTITRUST LIABILITY 
Courts have long recognized the inherent conflict between antitrust 
laws (such as the Sherman Act54 and the Clayton Act55) that encourage 
economic competition and labor laws (such as the National Labor 
Relations Act,56 Clayton Act,57 and Norris-LaGuardia Act58) that express 
a preference for resolving labor-management disputes through collective 
bargaining.59 One labor law, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 
encourages collective bargaining by allowing workers to form unions to 
negotiate terms and conditions of employment.60 At the same time, 
workers have the right not to be represented by a union.61 Other labor 
laws, including the Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act, limit federal 
courts from enjoining union activities.62 Courts recognize that successful 
collective bargaining requires cooperative activity both by employers 
and workers.63 And so long as restraints on competition are imposed 
through collective bargaining, courts will generally shield such 
cooperative activity from antitrust liability.64 The collective bargaining 
                                                     
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
55. Id. § 12. 
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–58 (2006). 
57. 15 U.S.C. § 17; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2006). Section 6 of the Clayton Act creates a basic statutory 
exemption for labor unions: “[N]or shall such organizations . . . be held or construed to be illegal 
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.” 15 U.S.C. § 17. 
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–05, 113 (2006). 
59. See Gabriel Feldman, Antitrust Versus Labor Law in Professional Sports: Balancing the 
Scales After Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1223 (2012). 
60. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to 
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate 
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and 
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the 
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or 
protection.”). 
61. 29 U.S.C. § 157; see also Feldman, supra note 59, at 1225 n.16. 
62. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 253 n.2 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissent); Brown v. 
Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  
63. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–15; 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006); see also Brown, 518 U.S. at 237 (“As a 
matter of logic, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to require groups of employers and 
employees to bargain together, but at the same time to forbid them to make among themselves or 
with each other any of the competition-restricting agreements potentially necessary to make the 
process work or its results mutually acceptable.”). 
64. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 237. 
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must be lawful under labor law and primarily affect the limited labor 
market the bargaining relationship encompasses.65 
The Supreme Court has recognized a “proper accommodation” as 
necessary to further both congressional policy favoring collective 
bargaining through the NLRA and congressional policy promoting 
economic competition under antitrust law.66 This balancing requires 
shielding some union-employer agreements from antitrust liability under 
the nonstatutory labor exemption.67 The exemption extends the same 
protections from antitrust liability for cooperative union activity to 
cooperative activity for multiemployer units.68 The D.C. Circuit has 
emphasized that the exemption is focused on the “process” surrounding 
collective bargaining and not the ultimate “product” of a collective 
bargaining agreement.69 The court also stressed the need to safeguard the 
“delicate balance of countervailing power” belonging to employers and 
workers in the bargaining process.70 As courts have interpreted the 
nonstatutory labor exemption, employees face a choice during 
bargaining of taking advantage of the collective bargaining process and 
the protections of labor law—such as the right to strike or bring an 
action before the NLRB—or foregoing those protections to bring an 
antitrust suit, but not both together.71 
Despite the public’s interest in professional sports, the Supreme Court 
also has made clear that the various leagues, teams, and players 
generally are entitled no special treatment under antitrust law.72 In 
professional sports, the nature of a league of independently owned and 
operated teams inherently conflicts with the Sherman Act’s prohibitions 
                                                     
65. See Brown, 50 F.3d at 1048. 
66. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 
(1975). 
67. See id.; Brown, 518 U.S. at 234, 237; see also Feldman, supra note 59, at 1224. 
68. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 134 (3d ed. 
2006) (“Whenever a collective bargaining agreement results in antitrust immunity for employees, 
the same immunity must presumably be afforded to employers bargaining or preparing to bargain 
on the other side of the same table. Thus the ‘non-statutory’ exemption [exists] . . . . The question is 
one of applying simple logic to labor policy, and the logic applies equally to single employers and 
multi-employer bargaining groups, provided that the latter are all involved in the same bargaining 
with the same set of unions over the same terms.”). 
69. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1050. 
70. Id. at 1052. 
71. See id. at 1057; see also Feldman, supra note 59, at 1247–48 (observing that “Brown appears 
to present employees with an either-or proposition” regarding labor or antitrust law).  
72. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 248 (“We can understand how professional sports may be special in 
terms of, say, interest, excitement, or concern. But we do not understand how they are special in 
respect to labor law’s antitrust exemption.”). 
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against contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade.73 
Teams compete on and off the field for championships, fan interest, and 
revenues.74 However, teams also must cooperate regarding rules, 
scheduling, roster sizes, and numerous other issues.75 Courts recognize 
that some anti-competitive restraints are acceptable to foster competitive 
balance in a league.76 As described by the Second Circuit in 2004, the 
NFL and NBA engage in a collective bargaining relationship with their 
players that is “provided for” and “promoted by” federal labor law.77 
Although the teams are independently owned, they can act jointly as a 
multiemployer bargaining unit in setting the terms and conditions of 
their players’ employment and their sport’s rules.78 As long as they set 
these terms and conditions through collective bargaining, the owners can 
operate a league of teams without facing antitrust liability.79 
However, with the collective bargaining relationship in both leagues 
tested in 2011, the NFL and NBA players challenged the limits of the 
nonstatutory labor exemption in their antitrust suits.80 They argued that 
the exemption no longer applied because they had dissolved their unions 
and therefore no longer were engaged in a bargaining relationship.81 A 
ruling in favor of the players would have exposed owners in both 
leagues to enormous potential liability, with the Clayton Act providing 
for the recovery of treble (triple) damages by a successful antitrust 
plaintiff.82 And the players looked to the Supreme Court’s Brown 
decision to frame the nonstatutory labor exemption’s parameters. 
                                                     
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, __U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 
2201, 2207 (2010). 
74. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212–13. 
75. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2004); Nat’l Basketball 
Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 689 (2d Cir. 1995) (“In the sports industry, multiemployer 
bargaining exists not only for the reasons stated above but also because some terms and conditions 
of employment must be the same for all teams in a sports league.”). 
76. See Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976) (“We do recognize, 
as did the district court, that the NFL has a strong and unique interest in maintaining competitive 
balance among its teams.”). 
77. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. See supra notes 30–32.  
81. See supra notes 30–32. 
82. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
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III.  IN BROWN, THE COURT CLARIFIED THAT THE 
EXEMPTION WILL NOT APPLY INDEFINITELY, BUT 
DECLINED TO DEFINE ITS “EXTREME OUTER 
BOUNDARIES” 
In 1996, the Supreme Court explored the boundaries of the 
relationship between collective bargaining protections and antitrust 
liability and the limits of the nonstatutory labor exemption in Brown v. 
Pro Football, Inc.83 The Court heard the appeal of a class-action suit 
brought by a group of football players against NFL owners.84 In an 8-1 
decision, the Court held that the nonstatutory labor exemption protected 
the owners from antitrust liability for their imposition of terms after 
reaching an impasse in bargaining with the NFLPA.85 The Court’s ruling 
that the nonstatutory labor exemption could extend beyond impasse—
but not indefinitely—would have important implications when the NFL 
and NBA players’ unions disclaimed representation and argued that this 
had terminated the collective bargaining relationship in 2011.86 
The case arose from the NFL’s desire to allow each team to carry six 
developmental squad players in addition to the players on its regular 
roster.87 These rookie and second-year players would practice and play 
in only limited circumstances.88 The NFLPA wanted the developmental 
squad players to have the same benefits and protections as full-fledged, 
regular-roster players, including the ability to individually negotiate 
salaries with teams.89 The NFL and NFLPA attempted to negotiate terms 
regarding the developmental squad players but reached an impasse after 
two months.90 The NFL owners then unilaterally instituted a 
developmental squad program, under which each player would sign a 
uniform contract and earn $1000 a week.91 A year later, 235 former 
                                                     
83. 518 U.S. 231, 233 (1996) (“This question in this case arises at the intersection of the Nation’s 
labor and antitrust laws.”). 
84. Id. at 233–34. The Court made clear that it would give the players and owners no special 
treatment under the country’s labor laws. See id. at 249 (“[I]t would be odd to fashion an antitrust 
exemption that gave additional advantages to professional football players . . . that transport 
workers, coal miners, or meat packers would not enjoy.”). 
85. Id. at 250. 
86. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 1, 21–23, 27–30; Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 
1, 17–21 (discussion of nonstatutory labor exemption defense). 
87. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 234 (1996). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 235. 
91. Id. 
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developmental squad players brought an antitrust suit against the 
owners.92 
The Court considered whether the nonstatutory labor exemption 
protected the NFL owners in a situation where they bargained to 
impasse, then imposed their last, best offer.93 The Court noted that 
stalled bargaining is far from the end of bargaining, describing impasse 
as a “recurring feature” in negotiations.94 The majority further termed 
“impasse” as a “temporary deadlock or hiatus in negotiations.”95 In 
almost all cases, the Court added, both sides will break an impasse, 
“through either a change in mind or the application of economic 
force.”96 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer offered background 
for the Court’s interpretation of the nonstatutory labor exemption.97 The 
Court infers the exemption from federal labor law and the preference for 
free and private collective bargaining, which requires good-faith 
bargaining over wages, hours, and working conditions.98 The exemption 
is a counterpart to federal labor law’s protections for unions and labor 
organizations from antitrust liability; it extends similar protections to 
multiemployer units.99 The nonstatutory labor exemption is consistent 
with Congress’ desire to “prevent judicial use of antitrust law to resolve 
labor disputes.”100 In the Court’s view, the nonstatutory labor exemption 
protects employer conduct that (1) took place during and immediately 
after collective-bargaining negotiations; (2) grew out of, and was 
directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process; (3) 
involved a matter that the parties were required to negotiate collectively; 
and (4) concerned only the parties to the collective bargaining 
                                                     
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 234. 
94. Id. at 245 (citing Bonanno Linen Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982)). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 245–46. The Court also described impasse and the implementation of proposals as an 
“integral part of the bargaining process.” Id. at 239. And the Court additionally noted that impasse 
may be a tactic brought on deliberately by one of the parties for “strategic purposes” during the 
bargaining process. Id. at 246. 
97. Id. at 235–38. 
98. Id. at 236. 
99. Id. at 237 (“[I]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to require groups of employers and 
employees to bargain together, but at the same time to forbid them to make among themselves or 
with each other any of the competition-restricting agreements potentially necessary to make the 
process work or its results mutually acceptable.”) (emphasis in original). 
100. Id. at 236. 
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relationship.101 
In particular, the Court noted that the NFL owners faced a no-win 
situation if the nonstatutory labor exemption did not protect their 
imposition of terms:102 
If the antitrust laws apply, what are employers to do once 
impasse is reached? If all impose terms similar to their last joint 
offer, they invite an antitrust action premised upon identical 
behavior . . . as tending to show a common understanding or 
agreement. If any, or all, of them individually impose terms that 
differ significantly from that offer, they invite an unfair labor 
practice charge . . . . All this is to say that to permit antitrust 
liability here threatens to introduce instability and uncertainty 
into the collective-bargaining process, for antitrust law often 
forbids or discourages the kinds of joint discussions and 
behavior that the collective-bargaining process invites or 
requires.103 
The Court additionally expressed concern about terminating the 
exemption at the point of impasse because such a rule “creates an 
exemption that can evaporate in the middle of the bargaining process.”104 
Most significantly for the NFL and NBA players in 2011, the Court 
held that the exemption would not indefinitely shield employers’ 
conduct.105 The Court stated that an agreement between employers could 
be “sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances” from collective 
bargaining such that subjecting employers to antitrust liability would not 
“significantly interfere” with the bargaining process.106 As such, the 
Court suggested that the exemption would last until the “collapse of the 
collective bargaining relationship.”107 A union’s decertification is an 
example of such a collapse.108 
The Court cited the D.C. Circuit’s Brown decision109 in endorsing 
decertification as one possible boundary between collective bargaining 
                                                     
101. Id. at 250. 
102. Id. at 241–42. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 246. 
105. Id. at 250 (“Our holding is not intended to insulate from antitrust review every joint 
imposition of terms by employers . . . .”). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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protections and antitrust liability.110 The D.C. Circuit had held that 
workers must choose between invoking the protections of labor law or 
the Sherman Act.111 Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards wrote, “If employees 
wish to seek the protections of the Sherman Act, they may forego 
unionization or even decertify their unions.”112 But employees could not 
take advantage of the many federal labor law protections Judge Edwards 
cited—including enhanced bargaining power as a union, the 
establishment of mandatory subjects of bargaining, protection of the 
right to strike, and ability to bring an unfair labor practice charge before 
the NLRB—while also pursuing antitrust litigation.113 Judge Edwards 
further noted that the NFL players previously had chosen to dissolve 
their union in successfully bringing an antitrust suit against NFL owners 
in 1991.114 By opting to remain a union, Judge Edwards concluded that 
the players would win concessions not through antitrust suits, but with 
“shrewd bargaining, favorable grievance settlements, victories in 
arbitration, and, when necessary, by striking.”115 
The Supreme Court did not adopt Judge Edwards’ reasoning or 
language beyond simply approving that decertification could mark one 
possible boundary for the exemption.116 The Court added that another 
boundary could be an “extremely long” impasse marked by “instability” 
or “defunctness” of the employer unit.117 Either way, the Court described 
both decertification and a protracted impasse as “extreme outer 
boundaries” where the nonstatutory labor exemption might no longer 
protect employers from antitrust liability.118 But the Court expressly 
declined to decide “whether, or where, within” such boundaries to draw 
the line between collective bargaining protections and antitrust 
liability.119 The Court added that it would be inappropriate to do so 
without the “detailed views” of the NLRB.120 As far as a disclaimer of 
                                                     
110. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250. 
111. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1057. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. (citing Note, Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory 
Labor Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 874, 883 (1991)). 
115. Id. 
116. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 251 (1996). 
117. Id. at 250 (citing El Cerrito Mill & Lumber Co., 316 N.L.R.B. 1005, 1006–07 (1995), 1995 
WL 152166). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. (“We need not decide in this case whether, or where, within these extreme outer 
boundaries to draw that line.”). 
120. Id. (citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87, 96 
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representation, the Court never addressed whether such action would 
mark an “extreme outer boundary” of collective bargaining allowing 
employees to bring an antitrust suit.121 
IV.  ALTHOUGH DISCLAIMER AND DECERTIFICATION BOTH 
FUNCTIONALLY DISSOLVE A UNION, IMPORTANT 
DISTINCTIONS EXIST BETWEEN THE TWO 
In 2011, the NFL and NBA players chose between two 
mechanisms—decertification and disclaimer of representation—to 
dissolve their unions before bringing their antitrust suits.122 This Part 
addresses the difference between decertification and disclaimer, as well 
as two significant NLRB rulings on the effectiveness of disclaimers. 
 Although both mechanisms serve to end a union’s representation of 
employees, important distinctions exist between the two.123 
Decertification is statutorily defined by the National Labor Relations Act 
and managed by the NLRB; a group of employees can call for a 
decertification election by submitting a petition to the NLRB signed by 
thirty percent of union members.124 The NLRB then schedules an 
election, typically within a month or two of the submission of the 
petition.125 If a majority of members vote for decertification, then the 
union ceases to represent the employees.126 Most significantly, once a 
union decertifies, it cannot re-form for twelve months.127 
A disclaimer of representation, by contrast, has none of the formality 
of a decertification election.128 The union leadership—which for the 
                                                     
(1957)). 
121. Id. Judge Edwards’ decision for the D.C. Circuit in Brown seemingly endorsed a disclaimer 
as being sufficient. Judge Edwards noted the NFLPA’s dissolution in Powell v. Nat’l Football 
League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), which was accomplished through a disclaimer, as well as 
the ability of workers to “forego unionization or even decertify their unions.” See Brown v. Pro 
Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
122. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1256 nn.196–98 (2012). 
123. Id. 
124. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006). 
125. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1256 n.197; see also Gabriel A. Feldman, The Issues Behind 
the NBA Players’ Decertification Strategy, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2011 8:27 a.m.), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gabriel-a-feldman/the-legal-issues-behind-t_2_b_1081107.html 
(noting that uncontested decertification elections can take place within thirty days of verification of 
petitions; an election might take place within forty-five to sixty days for a complex decertification 
such as the NBA players’).  
126. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1256 n.197. 
127. 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
128. As the NFL owners described it in their appeal to the Eighth Circuit, “Lacking the formality 
of decertification—an employee-driven process supervised by the NLRB that includes a vote by 
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NFLPA and NBPA included an executive committee of current 
players—renounces its interest in representing its workers in collective 
bargaining.129 Disclaimer requires no petition, vote, or recognition 
involving the NLRB, and the union’s role as the worker’s bargaining 
representative terminates immediately.130 
Whether through decertification or disclaimer of representation, 
employees forfeit important labor rights by dissolving their unions.131 
They lose the right to strike and the ability to bring an NLRB action 
against employers for failing to bargain in good faith.132 For the football 
players in 2011, the NFL considered unilaterally imposing an enhanced 
drug-testing program after the union dissolved.133 Previously, the NFL 
owners unilaterally lengthened the league’s season to seventeen games 
and cut insurance benefits after the union disclaimed representation in 
1989.134 
But the instantaneous termination of representation through a 
disclaimer raises concerns about its potential tactical use. In its briefs, 
the NFL argued that “[d]isclaimer, unlike decertification, can be undone 
as quickly as it is asserted.”135 The league’s chief concern was that a 
disclaimer can be “manipulated by the parties for bargaining purposes,” 
particularly if a court views it as a boundary between collective 
bargaining protections and antitrust liability.136 The NFL added that 
courts should defer to the NLRB in determining whether a disclaimer is 
valid or whether it is “simply a sham” not to be recognized.137 
                                                     
secret ballot—disclaimer is literally a paper-thin statement, issued unilaterally by a union.” Opening 
Brief of Appellants at 46, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 0:11-
cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 2011 WL 2003085. 
129. See Feldman supra note 59, at 1256 n.197 (“A disclaimer of interest occurs when a showing 
has been made that more than 50% of the employees in the union do not wish to be represented by 
the union.”); see also Feldman, supra note 125, The Issues Behind the NBA Players’ Decertification 
Strategy, (“Disclaimer is a less complicated process that could happen immediately—the union 
must simply renounce its interest in representing the employees in collective bargaining.”). 
130. See supra note 129. 
131. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1018 (D. Minn. 2011). 
132. Id. at 1001 (citing Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (D. Minn. 
1991)). 
133. Judy Battista, N.F.L. Considers Forcing New Testing Standards, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2011, 
at D2.  
134. Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (citing Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1359). 
135. Reply Brief of Appellants at 32, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 
2011) (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 2011 WL 2179417. 
136. Id. 
137. Opening Brief of Appellants at 35, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 
2011 WL 1750480. 
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Both the NFL owners and players cited a June 1991 NLRB advisory 
opinion that a previous disclaimer by the NFLPA was valid.138 In that 
advisory opinion (In re Pittsburgh Steelers, Inc.139), the NLRB 
expressed that the NFLPA’s disclaimer was effective because it was 
“unequivocal, made in good faith, and unaccompanied by any 
inconsistent conduct.”140 The opinion called a decertification election 
“an unnecessary waste of time and resources” for a union that already 
has made a valid disclaimer.141 The opinion also addressed the NFL’s 
contention that the union’s disclaimer was motivated by litigation 
strategy.142 The fact that the players were attempting to deny owners a 
defense to antitrust liability was “irrelevant” in the NLRB’s view as long 
as the disclaimer “is otherwise unequivocal and adhered to.”143 
The Pittsburgh Steelers ruling, however, is not the NLRB’s only word 
on the subject of disclaimers. In a 1958 case involving a group of 
workers bargaining with an association of department stores, the NLRB 
noted that a disclaimer must mark a “sincere abandonment, with relative 
permanency” of bargaining.144 The NLRB focused on the workers’ 
continued picketing as inconsistent behavior with having disclaimed 
representation as a union.145 The NLRB concluded that the workers’ 
“bare statement of disclaimer” was not enough “if the surrounding 
circumstances justify an inference to the contrary.”146 The NLRB 
described the union’s disclaimer as “a measure of momentary 
expedience, or strategy in bargaining.”147 In a 1964 case, the NLRB 
further declared that it was not compelled to recognize a disclaimer “just 
because the union uses the word,” while ignoring contrary 
circumstances.148 “The question must be decided in each case whether 
the union has in truth disclaimed, or whether its alleged disclaimer is 
                                                     
138. In re Pittsburgh Steelers, Inc., Case 6–CA–23143, 1991 WL 144468, at *1 (June 26, 1991). 
139. Case 6–CA–23143, 1991 WL 144468. 
140. Id. at *2 n.8. Robert E. Allen, the NLRB’s associate general counsel, authored the advisory 
opinion in response to a regional director’s request for advice. Id. at *1, *4. The NLRB’s Office of 
General Counsel responds to requests for advice from any of the agency’s regional directors by 
issuing a final determination through an advice memorandum. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 
779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1016 n.25 (D. Minn. 2011).  
141. Pittsburgh Steelers, 1991 WL 144468, at *2 n.8. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (Apr. 11, 1958), 1958 WL 13328. 
145. Id. at 392–93. 
146. Id. at 392. 
147. Id. at 394. 
148. Capitol Market No. 1, 145 N.L.R.B. 1430, 1431 (Jan. 1, 1964), 1964 WL 16218. 
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simply a sham and for that reason not to be given force and effect.”149 
The NFL owners looked to the 1958 NLRB ruling in arguing in 2011 
that the players’ disclaimer was not a “sincere abandonment” of 
bargaining.150 A U.S. District Court judge in Minnesota found that the 
NFL players validly disclaimed their union, citing the NLRB’s 
Pittsburgh Steelers ruling and rejecting the owners’ argument that the 
court needed to defer to the NLRB on the issue.151 The Eighth Circuit, 
however, ultimately did not resolve the question on appeal.152 
V.  IN 1991, THE NFL PLAYERS DISSOLVED THEIR UNION 
WITH A DISCLAIMER RECOGNIZED BY THE U.S. 
DISTRICT COURT IN MINNESOTA 
The acrimonious history between the NFL players and owners shaped 
their labor battle in 2011. They have had what the Eighth Circuit 
described in 1989 as an “often tempestuous relationship” going back 
decades.153 Before the players opted in 2011 to dissolve their union and 
bring antitrust suits, the two sides litigated over free agency in 1989 and 
1991—cases that also concerned a disclaimer’s effectiveness.154 Those 
cases served as important precedent when the owners and players 
returned to court in 2011.155 
In 1991, U.S. District Court Judge David Doty in Minnesota found 
that a group of players could bring an antitrust suit against the owners.156 
This followed the NFLPA’s decision to disclaim interest in serving as 
the players’ bargaining representative in the wake of an Eighth Circuit 
decision in 1989.157 Judge Doty found that the union had ceased to 
engage in collective bargaining dating to November 1989—some 
                                                     
149. Id. at 1432. 
150. Reply Brief of Appellants at 26, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 
2011) (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 2011 WL 2179417. 
151. See infra notes 197–203. 
152. See Brady, 644 F.3d at 682.  
153. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989). 
154. See id.; Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991). 
155. See Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 4, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 
F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011) (No. 11–639), 2011 WL 958695. 
156. Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1359 (“Because no ‘ongoing collective bargaining relationship’ 
exists, the court determines that nonstatutory labor exemption has ended.”). The decision was 
reported as Powell v. National Football League, but Judge Doty notes in a later decision that it 
should have been reported as McNeil v. National Football League given the motions that were 
decided. See McNeil, 777 F. Supp. 1475, 1478 n.1 (D. Minn. 1991). 
157. Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1354, 1356. 
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eighteen months before his decision.158 He ruled that the NFL owners 
were not forever exempt from antitrust laws and that the nonstatutory 
labor exemption would not apply “if the affected employees ceased to be 
represented by a certified union.”159 That had happened with the NFL 
players, leading Judge Doty to deny the owners’ motion for summary 
judgment.160 After later losing at trial, the NFL owners settled with the 
players, agreeing upon a deal that included a new collective bargaining 
agreement giving players greater rights as free agents to sign with new 
teams.161 The union also re-formed at the owners’ request.162 
Two years earlier, in 1989, the Eighth Circuit set the stage for Judge 
Doty’s ruling by holding that the players had to choose between 
continued bargaining or antitrust litigation.163 Although the owners and 
players had reached an impasse in bargaining, the court emphasized the 
economic and legal tools both sides still had to resolve the dispute.164 
The union could strike, the owners could lock out the players, and both 
could petition the NLRB, charging the other with unfair labor 
practices.165 But to allow the players to bring an antitrust suit as a union 
at impasse would “improperly upset the careful balance established by 
Congress through the labor law.”166 The court concluded by reviewing 
the choices facing the owners and players.167 The two sides could 
continue bargaining, which the court “strongly urge[d]” them to do.168 
They could resort to economic force or present claims to the NLRB.169 
But as long as either side could bring claims before the NLRB, or until 
                                                     
158. Id. at 1358. Judge Doty issued his decision on May 23, 1991. Id. at 1351. 
159. Id. at 1356, 1358 (“The Powell court . . . expressly rejected the idea that the NFL defendants 
enjoy endless antitrust immunity.”). 
160. Id. at 1358–59. 
161. See White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (D. Minn. 1993); McNeil v. 
Nat’l Football League, Civ. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (D. Minn. 1992) (special verdict 
form). A jury awarded $543,000 in damages, which the court then trebled. The parties settled the 
litigation before the District Court entered final judgment in McNeil. Id. 
162. See White, 822 F. Supp. at 1398; McNeil, 1992 WL 315292, at *1. 
163. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1301–02 (8th Cir. 1989). In her 
decision in Brady, Judge Susan Richard Nelson described the Eighth Circuit’s Powell holding as 
requiring the NFLPA to “jettison[] the entire collective bargaining apparatus—and the rights and 
benefits it provided to them” before bringing Sherman Act claims against the owners. Brady v. Nat’l 
Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000 (D. Minn. 2011).  
164. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1302. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 1303–04. 
168. Id. at 1303. 
169. Id. 
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those claims were resolved, the court held that the labor relationship 
between the owners and players continued and the nonstatutory labor 
exemption extended to shield the owners from antitrust liability.170 
Following the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the NFLPA’s executive 
committee voted to disclaim representation.171 The NFLPA notified NFL 
management of the decision, and a “substantial majority” of players 
signed petitions in the following weeks stating that neither the NFLPA 
nor any other entity was entitled to act as their bargaining 
representative.172 A month after the executive committee’s decision, 
player representatives from each team unanimously voted to end the 
NFLPA’s status as their bargaining representative and to restructure the 
organization.173 Judge Doty later recounted these steps the players 
undertook in executing the disclaimer.174 
In his decision, Judge Doty expressed that the majority will of 
employees is what defines the bargaining relationship.175 Under Section 
7 of the National Labor Relations Act, employees have an unconditional 
right not to unionize and not to engage in collective bargaining.176 
Because certification is not required to create a collective bargaining 
relationship, Judge Doty reasoned that decertification is not required to 
end it.177 Judge Doty thus found it unnecessary for the NLRB to 
decertify the union and allowed the players’ antitrust claims to go 
forward.178 
The NFL players would look to the cases from 1989 and 1991 in their 
2011 fight with owners. 
                                                     
170. Id. at 1303–04. In an interesting footnote, the court addressed the NFL’s legal concessions, 
one of which was that owners could face liability under the Sherman Act if the players ceased to be 
represented by a certified union. Id. at 1303 n.12.  
171. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Minn. 1991). 
172. Id. at 1354 & n.1. 
173. Id. at 1354. 
174. Id. at 1354, 1356. 
175. Id. at 1357. 
176. Id. at 1358. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 1358–59 (“The NFLPA also concedes that it has lost its majority status and may no 
longer bargain on the players’ behalf. Thus, there is no need for the NLRB to decertify the 
NFLPA.”). In a footnote, Judge Doty cited NLRB guidelines requiring no decertification election in 
cases where a union no longer wishes to continue as a bargaining representative. Id. at 1358 n.7.  
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VI.  THE NFL PLAYERS IN 2011 INITIALLY WON A 
FAVORABLE RULING REGARDING THE DISCLAIMER, 
BUT THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ULTIMATELY LEFT THE ISSUE 
UNRESOLVED 
After the NFLPA disclaimed representation and the players filed their 
antitrust suit in 2011, the players won a favorable ruling in U.S. District 
Court in Minnesota when Judge Susan Richard Nelson enjoined the 
lockout.179 The Eighth Circuit later reversed that decision, holding that 
the injunction violated the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which prohibits courts 
from issuing injunctions in cases growing out of labor disputes.180 
However, the Eighth Circuit did not rule on the disclaimer’s 
effectiveness or the merits of the players’ antitrust claims, leaving 
unanswered the question of whether the disclaimer would constitute an 
“extreme outer boundary” of the collective bargaining relationship and 
nonstatutory labor exemption.181 
Unlike their battles in the 1990s over free agency, the NFL owners 
and players clashed in 2011 over the split of revenues.182 The owners 
wanted a greater share of the league’s $9 billion in annual revenues—
players previously received 59.5% of revenues, after deducting the first 
$1 billion as cost credits for league expenses.183 The owners also sought 
a rookie wage scale and longer season.184 The owners and players 
unsuccessfully bargained for sixteen days with federal mediator George 
Cohen prior to expiration of the CBA.185 Then, with the CBA only hours 
away from expiring, the NFLPA dissolved effective at 4 p.m. on March 
11, 2011.186 This was accomplished through a disclaimer of 
representation: the player representatives from the league’s thirty-two 
teams voted to approve the disclaimer.187 Declaring itself no longer the 
players’ bargaining representative, the NFLPA reclassified as a 
                                                     
179. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1042–43 (D. Minn. 2011). 
180. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011). 
181. Id. at 682; see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996). 
182. See Judy Battista, In Labor Clash, N.F.L.’s Union Calls Old Play, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 
2011, at A1. 
183. See Jarrett Bell, The Last Game Until? A Looming Lockout by NFL Owners Could Put the 
2011 Season on Hold, USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 2011, at A1. 
184. Drape, supra note 45. 
185. See Battista, supra note 43. 
186. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 
5, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011) (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-
JJG), 2011 WL 956159. 
187. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 22. 
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professional association with the Department of Labor and Internal 
Revenue Service.188 The timing of the disclaimer was critical: the 
existing CBA barred the players from bringing an antitrust suit for six 
months once it expired.189 
That same day, ten players filed a class-action antitrust suit in U.S. 
District Court in Minnesota, while the NFL owners locked out players 
effective at midnight.190 The owners argued that the NFLPA’s disclaimer 
was invalid and the nonstatutory labor exemption still protected their 
conduct.191 Further, the owners emphasized that the disclaimer occurred 
“literally during” a bargaining session.192 The owners argued that the 
players’ “tactical and unilateral” decision to disclaim representation 
could not “instantaneously oust” federal labor law and the owners’ labor 
law rights.193 The owners argued: “A union cannot, by a tactical decision 
akin to the flip of a switch, transform a multiemployer bargaining unit’s 
lawful use of economic tools afforded it under the labor law into an 
antitrust violation” with treble damages and injunctive relief.194 The 
owners also contended that the NLRB would find the players’ disclaimer 
was not made in good faith and instead was employed for “momentary 
expedienc[y].”195 Notably, the owners used the players’ media 
comments against them, quoting players who suggested that the union 
would continue functioning even after purportedly being dissolved.196 
                                                     
188. See Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1003–04. During negotiations, the NFLPA received 
conditional approval from players to disclaim interest in collective bargaining if union leadership 
later found it was advantageous to do so. See also Opening Brief of Appellants at 6–7, Brady v. 
Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898). Executive director DeMaurice 
Smith asked for authority to dissolve the union in the fall. See Battista, supra note 182. The NFL 
argued that the players submitted no voting cards or other written documentation authorizing the 
disclaimer prior to the CBA’s expiration. See Brief of Appellants at 7 n.4, Brady v. Nat’l Football 
League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898). 
189. See Feldman, The Issues Behind the NBA Players’ Decertification Strategy, supra note 125. 
The NFL owners in their previous settlement also agreed not to challenge the players’ right to 
dissolve the union and pursue antitrust remedies if the players agreed to reform the union for a new 
CBA. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 19. 
190. The players’ chief antitrust complaints related to the NFL’s salary cap and college draft as 
well as its franchise player designations imposing restrictions on player free agency. See Brady 
Complaint, supra note 1, at 24–27. 
191. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 
9, Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (No. 11CV00639), 2011 WL 956159. 
192. See id. (emphasis in original). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 21 (quoting Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (1955)). 
196. Id. at 16. One player said the disclaimer was a “good decision and a good strategy on our 
part as a union.” Id. Another said the purpose of disclaimer was to have an “ace up our sleeve.” Id. 
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A month after the players’ suit, Judge Nelson issued an injunction 
halting the lockout after finding the players’ disclaimer effectively 
terminated the collective bargaining relationship.197 In particular, Judge 
Nelson rejected the owners’ argument that the court needed to defer to 
the NLRB in determining whether the disclaimer was effective.198 She 
echoed Judge Doty in finding that decertification was not required to end 
a bargaining relationship and cited the NLRB’s “numerous opinions” 
over the years addressing disclaimers.199 Judge Nelson ruled that the 
players’ disclaimer was unequivocal, made in good faith, and 
unaccompanied by inconsistent conduct.200 Judge Nelson noted that “no 
legal support” existed for the requirement that a disclaimer be a 
permanent abandonment of collective bargaining, adding, “[e]mployees 
have the right not only to organize as a union but also to refrain from 
such representation and, as relevant here, to ‘de-unionize.’”201 Because 
the players gave up “significant rights” by disclaiming, Judge Nelson 
found that “any subjective motivation” regarding the disclaimer was 
irrelevant.202 This was consistent with the NLRB’s standard from its 
1991 Pittsburgh Steelers advisory opinion for evaluating disclaimers.203 
With the players having disclaimed representation, Judge Nelson 
found that the collective bargaining relationship had ended entirely.204 
She distinguished the present circumstances with those in Brown in 
which the owners and players had reached impasse.205 The NFLPA’s 
dissolution provided a “clear boundary” marking the end of collective 
bargaining.206 “There is no need to wait and see if any temporary 
impasse will be surmounted or prove intractable,” Judge Nelson 
                                                     
at 15. Derrick Mason, another football player, said the players were “per se, no,” not a union, “but 
we’re still going to act as one” and would “try to as a whole get a deal done.” Id. at 16. 
197. Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1042–43. 
198. Id. at 1021–22. 
199. Id. at 1014–15. 
200. Id. at 1022. 
201. Id. at 1015. 
202. Id. at 1018. 
203. Id. at 1015–19; see also In re Pittsburgh Steelers, Inc., Case 6–CA–23143, 1991 WL 
144468, at *1, *4 n.8 (June 26, 1991). 
204. Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1021–22 (“[U]nlike impasse—which occurs within the collective 
bargaining process of negotiations, but frequently amounts to nothing more than a ‘timeout’—such 
a disclaimer removes the dispute from the collective bargaining framework.”). 
205. Id. at 1040 (“Brown concerned an impasse occurring within the context of a collective 
bargaining relationship that likely could continue. Here, in contrast, the parties have left the 
collective bargaining framework entirely.”). 
206. Id. at 1020. 
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wrote.207 The players’ disclaimer triggered a “definitive and immediate” 
renunciation of collective bargaining and labor law protections.208 Judge 
Nelson lastly found “nothing inherently unfair or inequitable” with the 
players’ disclaimer instantaneously ending the bargaining relationship, 
noting that the players lost significant rights and faced similar 
consequences from their decision.209 
Judge Nelson went on to find that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not 
prohibit the court from issuing an injunction halting the lockout because 
the collective bargaining relationship between the owners and players no 
longer existed.210 As for the players’ antitrust claims, Judge Nelson 
suggested that the players’ disclaimer left the owners exposed to 
liability.211 
The owners appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing again that the 
union’s disclaimer was tactical and the nonstatutory labor exemption 
continued to offer antitrust protection, as well as contending that the 
District Court should have deferred to the NLRB.212 The owners asserted 
that “no student of the history of this industry” could believe that the 
players had abandoned the union.213 The owners cited Brown in arguing 
that the disclaimer must be sufficiently distant in time and circumstances 
from bargaining for the exemption to cease.214 The owners argued: “In 
the context of multiemployer bargaining, the mere potential for antitrust 
scrutiny, activated at an unpredictable time by unilateral decision of the 
potential antitrust plaintiffs across the bargaining table, would frustrate 
federal labor law by inhibiting collective action and robust negotiations 
throughout the bargaining process.”215 Their final argument concerned 
Judge Nelson’s authority to issue an injunction under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act because the issues grew out of a labor dispute.216 Four 
                                                     
207. Id. at 1021. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 1042–43.  
211. Id. at 1040 (“Although it remains to be decided whether the nonstatutory labor exemption 
still applies to protect the League from antitrust claims regarding player restraints, it is clear that the 
holding of Brown, which is confined to impasse, offers no absolute shield against such claims.”). 
212. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 22, 26–27, 29–35, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 
661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 2011 WL 2179417. 
213. Id. at 22. 
214. Id. at 32. 
215. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 45, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 
2011 WL 2003085 (emphasis in original). 
216. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 2–6, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 
2011 WL 2179417. 
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days after Judge Nelson’s decision, the Eighth Circuit granted a 
temporary stay of the injunction pending appeal.217 
Three weeks later, the Eighth Circuit granted a full stay pending 
appeal of Judge Nelson’s injunction, expressing skepticism about her 
interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.218 In a 2-1 decision, the court 
held that it could not reconcile the timing of the players’ suit with Judge 
Nelson’s finding that the case did not arise or grow out of a labor dispute 
and that Norris-LaGuardia therefore did not apply.219 Following the 
decision, the NFL called on players to resume negotiations and “control 
their own destiny” on a new CBA.220 
After granting the stay pending appeal in May, the Eighth Circuit 
heard oral arguments in June and reversed Judge Nelson’s decision.221 
Arguing for the owners, former Solicitor General Paul Clement notably 
claimed that the exemption should extend for at least a year after a union 
dissolves.222 The same Eighth Circuit panel split 2-1 and again rejected 
Judge Nelson’s interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.223 The court 
held that the case arose from a labor dispute, noting that the players and 
owners were parties to a CBA for more than eighteen years and had 
bargained for more than two years before the players’ suit.224 The court 
also noted that the NFLPA disclaimed and players filed suit in a single 
day.225 Judge Steven Colloton wrote for the majority: “The labor dispute 
                                                     
217. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 638 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 2011). 
218. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 789–91 (8th Cir. 2011).  
219. Id. The court held that given the “close temporal and substantive relationship” between the 
players’ suit and the league’s labor dispute, “we struggle at this juncture to see why this case is not 
at least one ‘growing out of a labor dispute.’” Id. at 791–92. 
220. See Judy Battista, Owners Win Delay in Lockout Case, Keeping N.F.L. Shut, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 17, 2011, at B16. 
221. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663; see Judy Battista, Judge Advises N.F.L. and Players to Continue 
Efforts to End Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2011, at D6. Judge Bye told the lawyers arguing the 
case, “We won’t . . . be all that hurt that you’re leaving us out if you should go out and settle the 
case.” Id. 
222. Id. (“Clement also said the nonstatutory labor exemption should apply for at least a business 
cycle after a union dissolves itself—meaning the lockout would not be subject to antitrust law for at 
least a year—and he called antitrust charges made by players ‘extraneous.’”). Judge Bye noted in 
his dissent that the NFL advocated for the exemption to continue for a year or one business cycle 
following the union’s dissolution. Brady, 644 F.3d at 687 (Bye, J., dissenting) (“At some point in 
the ‘arising out of’ spectrum, the antitrust immunities stemming from statutory and nonstatutory 
labor exemptions must come to an end and give way to antitrust remedies. Such point does not 
come a year from the union disclaimer, nor one business cycle from it, as suggested by the League’s 
counsel. Rather, such point comes at the moment of the union disclaimer.”). 
223. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663, 673. 
224. Id. at 673. 
225. Id. 
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did not suddenly disappear just because the Players elected to pursue the 
dispute through antitrust litigation rather than collective bargaining.”226 
However, the Eighth Circuit did not rule on whether the exemption 
continued to apply following the players’ disclaimer.227 With the case 
continuing no further, the Eighth Circuit’s decision left all issues 
regarding the effectiveness of a disclaimer of representation and the 
exemption’s boundaries unresolved.228 
Even as they awaited the Eighth Circuit’s ruling, the NFL owners and 
players resumed bargaining.229 They reached agreement on a new CBA 
in time to play a full season, cancelling only an annual preseason 
game.230 Players received forty-seven percent of all revenues, with most 
cost-credit deductions for owners eliminated.231 Owners agreed to 
shorten off-season training programs and reduce practice time during the 
preseason and regular season.232 To approve the new CBA following 
their disclaimer, the players voted to reconstitute the union and then 
approved the CBA.233 
Although the NBA players similarly dissolved their union through a 
disclaimer, they did so only after months of unsuccessful bargaining 
following imposition of the lockout.234 With players and owners 
reaching agreement on a new CBA two weeks after the disclaimer (and 
with the clock ticking on their season), no court issued a comparable 
ruling in the NBA lockout as in the NFL lockout.235 
                                                     
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 682 (“In particular, we express no view on whether the League’s nonstatutory labor 
exemption from the antitrust laws continues after the union’s disclaimer.”). 
228. Id. 
229. See Judy Battista, N.F.L. Set to Proceed Toward Deal with Players, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 
2011, at B12. 
230. See Battista, supra notes 41, 49. 
231. See Ken Belson, With Lockout Over, One Jet is Left to Explain It To His Teammates, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at B10. The owners sought cost-credit deductions for business expenses 
including stadium enhancements, running the NFL television network, promotional activities, and 
overseas marketing. See Battista, supra note 43; Tom Pedulla, The NFL’s Labor Dispute: Answers 
to Key Questions, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2011. 
232. See supra note 231. 
233. See Judy Battista, Owners Vote in Favor of Tentative Labor Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 
2011, at B11. The NFLPA wanted to collect union cards from players before re-forming to bolster 
its contention that the dissolution was not a sham to gain bargaining leverage. This was important in 
the event the union’s legitimacy was challenged in future negotiations. Id. 
234. See infra Part VII. 
235. See infra Part VII. 
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VII.  THE NBA PLAYERS REFRAINED FROM DISSOLVING 
THEIR UNION FOR MONTHS BEFORE THE LOCKOUT WAS 
QUICKLY RESOLVED FOLLOWING THEIR DISCLAIMER 
The NBA owners’ commitment to a “fundamental overhaul” of 
league economics marked the beginning of the basketball lockout.236 
Owners claimed that twenty-two of the league’s thirty teams were losing 
money and that those losses amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars 
annually.237 Billions of dollars separated the owners’ and the players’ 
proposals when the CBA expired on July 1, 2011, and the owners 
imposed a lockout.238 Unlike the NFL players, however, the NBA 
players negotiated with the team owners on a new CBA for nearly four-
and-a-half months following the lockout before dissolving their union 
and filing antitrust suits.239 From the start of the lockout, NBPA officials 
viewed dissolving the union as a last-ditch option and pledged to 
continue negotiating with owners.240 But as months passed with no 
resolution, the NBPA faced mounting pressure to decertify or disclaim 
representation, driven by several prominent players’ agents.241 
The owners and players engaged in months of bruising negotiations, 
marked by the repeated breakdown of talks, and finally culminating in a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer that NBA Commissioner David Stern issued in 
                                                     
236. See Beck, supra note 2. 
237. See Beck, supra notes 2, 43. The owners sought not only an increased share of revenues, but 
also restrictions on player movement as free agents, shorter contracts, a tougher salary cap, and 
lower salaries. See Beck, supra notes 2, 43. 
238. See Beck, supra notes 2, 43; Mahoney, supra note 44. NBA Commissioner David Stern 
said: “We had a great year in terms of the appreciation of our fans for our game. It just wasn’t a 
profitable one for the owners, and it wasn’t one that many of the smaller market teams particularly 
enjoyed or felt included in.” Mahoney, supra note 44. 
239. See Beck, supra note 16 (“The N.F.L. players dissolved their union before their labor deal 
had expired. The N.B.A. players have been trying to negotiate a new deal for more than four 
months, and did not disband their union until the league ostensibly stopped negotiating.”). 
240. Beck, supra note 43. NBPA executive director Billy Hunter’s pledged to continue to 
negotiate; “That was sort of the closing agreement up there, that we would not let the imposition of 
a lockout stop us from meeting.” Id. 
241. See Adrian Wojnarowski, NBA Union Faces Test of Strength, YAHOO.COM, Sept. 14, 2011, 
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/nba-union-faces-test-strength-074200148—nba.html. Agents viewed 
the prospect of an unfavorable court ruling as the only way to win concessions from owners. Adrian 
Wojnarowski, Agents Pushing for Clear Union Strategy, YAHOO.COM, Sept. 7, 2011, 
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/agents-pushing-clear-union-strategy-185200144—nba.html; Adrian 
Wojnarowski, NBA Agents Want Union to Decertify, YAHOO.COM, July 23, 2011, 
http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_nba_agents_decertification_072311 
(quoting a prominent agent as saying, “We have one weapon left, and that’s decertification. We 
need to use it,”). 
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November.242 Either the players could accept a proposed 50/50 split of 
revenues or Stern promised the owners’ next “reset” offer would include 
a 53/47 split of revenues in the owners’ favor, along with a hard salary 
cap and shorter contracts.243 The 50/50 split amounted to a $3 billion 
giveback by players in a potential ten-year CBA.244 After the players 
rejected the proposal, the NBPA resorted to its last-ditch option and 
disclaimed interest in continuing to represent the players in 
bargaining.245 By then, Stern had canceled the season’s first month of 
games.246 Now facing the possibility of a lost season, Stern described the 
players’ decision as sending the NBA into a “nuclear winter” of 
uncertainty.247 A lost season would have cost the players and owners an 
estimated $2 billion collectively for each side.248 
Once they opted to dissolve their union, the NBA players mirrored the 
NFL players’ actions. The NBPA disclaimed representation and a group 
of players filed antitrust suits the following day.249 One group of players 
brought suit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
while another group did so in U.S. District Court in Minnesota, where 
the NFL players had won a favorable ruling from Judge Nelson only 
months earlier.250 The players charged that as early as 2007, Stern and 
                                                     
242. See Howard Beck, A Final Proposal, with Hopes of a Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2011, at 
B15. After meeting with owners and players for thirty hours over three days in October, federal 
mediator George Cohen walked away from the talks saying, “No useful purpose would be served by 
requesting the parties to continue the mediation process at this time.” Howard Beck, N.B.A. Talks 
Break Off, Threatening November Games, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at B16. That same day, 
NBPA executive director Billy Hunter claimed that the NBA had planned for two or three years to 
lock out the players, break the union, and impose a new economic system. Id. 
243. See Beck, supra note 242; Howard Beck, Facing Deadline, Players Committee Will Confer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, at D4. 
244. See Howard Beck, N.B.A. Negotiations Resume, with Possible Breakthrough, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2011, at B13. 
245. See Beck, supra notes 16, 19. 
246. See id. 
247. See id. 
248. See Howard Beck, Long Shot by Players is a Nudge Toward Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 
2011, at B18. 
249. See Class Action Complaint at 15–16, Butler v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, No. 011-cv-03352-
PJS-SER (D. Minn. filed Nov. 15, 2011); see also Howard Beck, In Attempt to Force Talks, Players 
File Antitrust Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, at B15; Beck, supra note 16. The player 
representatives from the NBA’s thirty teams voted unanimously for the NBPA to disclaim its role as 
the players’ bargaining representative. According to the players, a substantial majority of players 
previously signed authorization cards empowering the NBPA to disclaim representation if 
unionization no longer was in the players’ best interests. The NBPA converted to a trade association 
and started the process of reclassifying with the Department of Labor and the IRS.  
250. See Class Action Complaint at 1, Butler, No. 011-cv-03352-PJS-SER; Anthony Complaint, 
supra note 1, at 1; Beck, supra note 249.  
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Deputy Commissioner Adam Silver met with NBPA Executive Director 
Billy Hunter and informed Hunter that the owners were “prepared to 
lock out the players for two years to get everything” they wanted in a 
new CBA.251 The players added that Stern promised a potential deal 
would only get worse during the lockout.252 The players also asserted 
that the league wanted to guarantee owners a ten percent profit annually, 
regardless of whether their teams succeeded on the basketball court.253 
In anticipation of the players’ suit, the NBA preemptively sued the 
NBPA in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in 
August 2011, seeking a declaratory judgment that any disclaimer would 
be ineffective.254 The owners claimed that the NBPA had threatened to 
disclaim dozens of times and bring antitrust litigation in every CBA 
negotiation dating to 1970.255 The owners argued: “[D]espite the 
NBPA’s repeated invocation of the antitrust laws in an effort to gain 
leverage in bargaining, the ultimate resolution on each such occasion . . . 
has always been the same: a collectively-bargained agreement between 
the NBA and NBPA negotiated pursuant to federal labor law containing 
the very practices the NBPA had challenged as antitrust violations.”256 
The NBA called the threatened disclaimer “an impermissible negotiating 
tactic” and not a “good faith, permanent relinquishment” of bargaining 
rights.257 The NBA sought a declaratory judgment that its lockout was 
legal and that the nonstatutory labor exemption protected owners from 
antitrust liability.258 Conversely, the NBA requested that if the court 
found the disclaimer valid, it declare all contracts between players and 
teams void and unenforceable as the product of a now-defunct 
bargaining process.259 
After more than four months of failed bargaining through the lockout, 
the NBA players contended in their lawsuits that the collective 
bargaining relationship had collapsed in the context of Brown.260 The 
players noted that they bargained twenty-three times even before the 
                                                     
251. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 12. 
252. Id. 
253. Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 13. 
254. Class Action Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1, Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Nat’l 
Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 11CV05369 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 2, 2011), 2011 WL 3274242. 
255. Id. at 10. 
256. Id. at 10–11. 
257. Id. at 2. 
258. Id. at 17–18. 
259. Id. at 21. 
260. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 17–19, 20–21. 
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CBA expired, offered hundreds of millions of dollars in concessions, and 
faced nonnegotiable demands in return from owners.261 They cited 
Stern’s words accompanying his November ultimatum—“We have made 
our revised proposal and we’re not planning to make another one”—as 
evidence that the league had no intention of negotiating material changes 
to its proposal.262 The players argued that these collective circumstances 
marked the abandonment of collective bargaining by owners even before 
their disclaimer.263 They further cited their own “caution and reluctance” 
in disclaiming representation, noting that the NBPA had never taken 
such a step since its establishment in 1954 despite facing pressure to do 
so during previous negotiations.264 Unlike the NFL players, who 
disclaimed following a bargaining session and on the eve of their CBA’s 
expiration, the NBA players argued that their disclaimer was prompted 
by months (if not years) of frustrated negotiations.265 
 With the clock ticking on their season, though, the NBA owners 
and players resumed negotiations and resolved the lockout two weeks 
after the disclaimer and start of litigation.266 The players consolidated 
their suits in the days after filing, but no court heard arguments or ruled 
on the issues raised.267 Following a fifteen-hour bargaining session, the 
owners and players announced agreement on a new CBA at 3:40 a.m. on 
November 26, 2011.268 The agreement came in time for the league to 
salvage a sixty-six-game season beginning on Christmas.269 Owners 
received $300 million in annual salary concessions from players, who 
                                                     
261. Id. at 12–13, 18. 
262. Id. at 17. 
263. Id. at 3–5, 17–18. 
264. Id. at 17. 
265. See id. at 12–17 (citing NBA owners’ intransigence in negotiations dating to June 2007). 
The NBA players cited the ultimatum as evidence of the owners’ “effective destruction” of the 
bargaining process in their Complaint. See id. at 4. Some commentators have argued that because 
the NBA players waited months before disclaiming, a court might have been more inclined to view 
their disclaimer as marking the end of the collective bargaining relationship. See Gabe Feldman, 
NBA Lockout: The NBA’s Nuclear Winter—Where Do We Go From Here?, GRANTLAND.COM, Nov. 
22, 2011, http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/10276/nba-lockout-the-
nba%E2%80%99s-nuclear-winter-%E2%80%94-where-do-we-go-from-here (“Why did Billy 
Hunter wait so long after the CBA expired to disclaim interest? . . . Maybe he though[t] the delay 
would strengthen the players’ argument that the disclaimer ended the non-statutory labor 
exemption.”). 
266. Beck, supra notes 19, 244. 
267. See Howard Beck, N.B.A. Players Merge Lawsuits; No Hearing Date Set, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
22, 2011, at B18. 
268. Beck, supra note 19. 
269. Id. 
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received 51.2 percent of revenues under the new CBA for the 2011–12 
season.270 Executive Director Hunter said at the press conference 
announcing the agreement, “We just thought that rather than try to 
pursue this in court, it was in both of our interests to try to reach a 
resolution.”271 
VIII. THE NFL AND NBA LOCKOUTS SHOULD LEAVE COURTS 
WARY OF RECOGNIZING FUTURE UNION DISCLAIMERS 
Although the NFL and NBA lockouts left the question unanswered of 
whether a union’s disclaimer of representation terminates the collective 
bargaining relationship in the context of Brown, courts should be wary 
of recognizing future disclaimers. The destabilizing effect of a 
disclaimer on the collective bargaining process should concern courts 
that previously have struggled to strike the proper balance between 
encouraging bargaining while preserving the possibility of antitrust 
liability.272 In the event of a disclaimer, courts have a variety of options 
to consider for marking the boundary between collective bargaining 
protections and antitrust liability.273 Those options include insisting on a 
formal decertification by the union (despite being portrayed as 
unnecessary by courts in the past);274 deferring to the NLRB in 
determining whether a disclaimer is effective;275 or extending the 
nonstatutory labor exemption for a reasonable period following a 
disclaimer.276 
This Comment argues that courts should extend the exemption for a 
reasonable period following a disclaimer as the best means of separating 
deserving antitrust claims from those merely used as bargaining tactics. 
The NFL owners argued before the Eighth Circuit that such a reasonable 
period could extend for either a year or one business cycle following a 
union’s disclaimer.277 This is a reasonable standard: by applying such a 
principle, courts would minimize the potentially destabilizing effect on 
                                                     
270. See id.; Marc Stein, Billy Hunter Sends Players Memo on BRI, ESPN.COM, Nov. 27, 2011, 
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7285446/billy-hunter-tells-players-get-512-percent-bri-2011-12. 
271. See Beck, supra note 19. 
272. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 241–42 (1996). 
273. See infra notes 274–76. 
274. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250; Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1042–43 
(D. Minn. 2011); Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1358 (D. Minn. 1991). 
275. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250. 
276. The NFL owners advocated for the latter during arguments before the Eighth Circuit in the 
Brady case. See supra note 222. 
277. See supra note 222. 
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the bargaining process that the Supreme Court emphasized in connection 
with the impasse in Brown.278 In addition, this would allow courts to 
distinguish between claims brought by plaintiffs such as the Powell 
players, who pursued antitrust litigation without a union for eighteen 
months, and the Brady players, who filed suit the same day as they 
disclaimed representation and dissolved the union.279 
A.  By Immediately Recognizing a Players’ Union’s Disclaimer, 
Courts Risk Destabilizing the Bargaining Process 
The prospect of destabilizing in the bargaining process that so 
concerned the Court in Brown directly applies when a union is capable 
of unilaterally disclaiming representation, followed by its members 
immediately bringing an antitrust suit against the employer.280 The NFL 
owners emphasized this potential threat to the bargaining process in their 
arguments in Brady.281 In the 2011 lockouts, the NFL and NBA players 
went from bargaining to antitrust litigation in a matter of hours—
whether it was prior to expiration of a CBA for the NFL players or 
months into a lockout for the NBA players.282 The NFL owners noted 
that the players’ legal argument for terminating the nonstatutory labor 
exemption would “immediately and easily convert collective conduct 
encouraged by the labor laws into conduct condemned by the antitrust 
laws.”283 As a result, the NFL players’ actions are difficult to view as 
sufficiently distant in time and circumstances from the bargaining 
process to terminate the exemption and to expose employers to antitrust 
                                                     
278. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 241–42, 246. 
279. See Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1358; Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 21–23; supra note 158. 
280. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 241–42, 246.  
281. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 48, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898) (“[T]he decision to engage in collective bargaining, especially 
multiemployer collective bargaining, has consequences. Even if a union purports to reverse that 
decision, it has no reasonable basis to assume that it can instantly and unilaterally shift the 
governing legal structure to the immediate disadvantage, if not peril, of the multiemployer 
bargaining unit.”). 
282. As the NFL owners argued in their brief to the Eighth Circuit:  
When, as in this case, an antitrust suit follows disclaimer by mere hours, when that disclaimer 
is in direct response to events at the collective bargaining table and even more when there are 
strong indications that the union will return and enter into a new collective bargaining 
agreement, the suit cannot be said to be ‘sufficiently distant in time and circumstances’ from 
the collective bargaining process unless those words have no meaning. 
Opening Brief of Appellants at 48–49, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 11-1898). 
283. Id. at 48 (emphasis in original). 
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liability.284 Although the Court addressed a bargaining impasse in 
Brown, it voiced an underlying concern about circumstances that 
“threaten to introduce instability and uncertainty in the collective-
bargaining process, for antitrust law often forbids or discourages the 
kinds of joint discussions and behavior that the collective-bargaining 
process invites or requires.”285 These are the same factors present when a 
players’ union can disclaim interest and immediately file an antitrust 
suit, claiming the end of a bargaining relationship that was present just 
hours earlier.286 
One key consideration is that a disclaimer can mark the end of union 
representation and termination of a bargaining relationship, but it also 
can be reversed just as quickly if the union opts to re-form.287 The labor 
rights that Judge Nelson and others have emphasized that a union 
sacrifices in dissolving are far from being lost forever when a union can 
reconstitute just as easily as it disbanded.288 This is critically different 
from a formal decertification, which would prohibit a union from re-
forming for twelve months—a consequence requiring significantly 
greater consideration by union members weighing what steps to take.289 
In advocating for extending the exemption beyond a union’s disclaimer, 
the NFL owners noted the likelihood of resuming collective 
bargaining.290 The NFL owners also cited the threat that recognizing 
unilateral disclaimers would pose to employers, especially in light of a 
union’s ability to manipulate a disclaimer for bargaining purposes.291 As 
the NFL and NBA lockouts showed, the players’ antitrust suits—after 
they had seemingly ended the bargaining relationship with owners—
were in fact resolved with negotiations culminating in new CBAs and re-
                                                     
284. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250. 
285. Id. at 241–42 (1996). 
286. See supra note 282. 
287. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1260 n.223 (“The dissolution of the union, either through 
decertification or disclaimer of interest, need not be permanent. In fact, if the employer consents, 
there is no limit on how quickly a dissolved union can re-form.”). 
288. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1260 n.223. 
289. See supra note 127. 
290. See supra notes 213, 229. 
291. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 45, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898) (“In both situations, the exemption must continue not only because there 
is a prospect that collective bargaining will resume, but also because the prospect that the exemption 
could abruptly end due to a union’s unilateral action would significantly impede, stifle, and hinder 
the collective bargaining process from its outset. Moreover, either can be readily ‘manipulated by 
the [union] for bargaining purposes.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 
518 U.S. 246 (1996))). 
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formation of the respective unions.292 
Although Judge Nelson cited the 1991 Powell decision in recognizing 
the NFLPA’s 2011 disclaimer, courts also should not be afraid to 
distinguish the Powell circumstances.293 By the time Judge Doty ruled in 
Powell, the NFL players were eighteen months removed from their 
disclaimer.294 Judge Doty found no inconsistent conduct by the players 
in that time.295 He also noted that the players suffered in the absence of a 
union, with the NFL lengthening the season and reducing their benefits 
unilaterally.296 By contrast, the NFLPA was only a month removed from 
its disclaimer when Judge Nelson ruled in 2011.297 Judge Nelson 
addressed this concern by stating, “The fact that substantial time had 
passed in [Powell] since the union’s disclaimer is not controlling here, 
because Judge Doty did not condition his ruling on the legal effect of 
disclaimer based on any such temporal restrictions.”298 
However, courts should revisit the Powell precedent with a better 
appreciation for how such disclaimers played out during the 2011 
lockouts. A court that extends the nonstatutory labor exemption for a 
reasonable period following a players’ union’s disclaimer can both 
recognize deserving plaintiffs such as those in Powell while guarding 
against destabilizing the bargaining relationship. 
B. Instead, Courts Should Extend Nonstatutory Labor Exemption 
Protections for a Reasonable Period Following a Disclaimer 
By extending the exemption to shield employers from antitrust 
liability for a reasonable period following a union’s disclaimer, courts 
would wisely delay recognizing disclaimers from plaintiffs such as those 
in Brady while allowing plaintiffs such as those in Powell to pursue 
antitrust litigation.299 A union that wanted to expedite its antitrust claims 
could opt for formal decertification—which the Supreme Court endorsed 
                                                     
292. See supra notes 229–33, 266–71. 
293. See supra notes 134, 156–60. 
294. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Minn. 1991). The NFLPA 
officially disclaimed representation in November and December 1989; Judge Doty issued his 
decision on May 23, 1991. Id. at 1351. 
295. Id. at 1358 (“The NFLPA no longer engages in collective bargaining and has also refused 
every overture by the NFL defendants to bargain since November of 1989.”). 
296. Id. at 1359. 
297. Judge Nelson issued her ruling on April 25, 2011. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. 
Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011). The players filed their complaint on March 11, 2011. Id. at 1003–04. 
298. Id. at 1041. 
299. See Powell, 764 F. Supp. 1351; Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1042–43. 
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in Brown as an outer boundary for the nonstatutory labor exemption—
but would sacrifice labor-law rights and the ability to re-form for twelve 
months by doing so.300 This would help separate deserving antitrust 
claims from tactical moves designed to enhance bargaining leverage.301 
This is also in line with courts’ preference for resolving collective 
bargaining disputes through “voluntary agreement and labor remedies 
rather than judicial intervention.”302 
By extending the exemption’s protections for a reasonable period 
following a disclaimer, courts also could delay to allow the NLRB to 
determine the validity of such a disclaimer.303 As the NFL owners 
argued, the validity of a disclaimer is a legal question best reserved to 
the agency’s administrative expertise.304 The Supreme Court made clear 
in Brown that it would not attempt to draw any dividing lines for the 
nonstatutory labor exemption without the NLRB’s specialized 
knowledge.305 In her Brady decision, Judge Nelson noted the NLRB’s 
                                                     
300. Some writers have even questioned whether courts should recognize a formal decertification 
occurring soon after a stall in bargaining. See Marc J. Yoskowitz, Note, A Confluence of Labor and 
Antitrust Law: The Possibility of Union Decertification in the National Basketball Association to 
Avoid the Bounds of Labor Law and Move Into the Realm of Antitrust, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
579, 617 (1998) (“[Should decertification] take place early in the process, without good faith 
attempts at negotiations, and prior to a prolonged impasse, this tactic will be viewed as a sham, and 
courts will reject this tactic and maintain the nonstatutory labor exemption.”). 
301. Tulane sports law professor Gabriel Feldman argues that players should be able to pursue 
antitrust remedies as soon as they dissolve their union. He additionally argues that decertification 
and disclaimer of interest equally terminate a union and the collective bargaining relationship. See 
Feldman, supra note 59, at 1254–61 (“[A contrary theory] subverts federal labor policy by 
effectively depriving employees of their statutorily protected right to opt out of a union by 
penalizing their initial involvement with a union.”). 
302. See Feldman, supra note 59, at 1230. 
303. The NFL owners argued in Brady that the NLRB had primary jurisdiction to rule on the 
validity of the players’ disclaimer. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 31–39, Brady v. Nat’l 
Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898) (“The fact that the District Court felt 
the need to engage in that long excursion [into NLRB precedents concerning the validity of 
disclaimers] is a clear signal that the court was intruding into the Board’s primary jurisdiction.”). 
304. Reply Brief of Appellants at 24, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 0:11-cv-00639-SRN-JJG), 2011 
WL 2179417. The NFL argued that the NLRB “and not the District Court, should assess the facts 
pertaining to this disclaimer in light of the policies underlying” the National Labor Relations Act. 
Id. The NFL owners also noted that the Pittsburgh Steelers ruling was not binding precedent for the 
Board and that the advisory opinion did not take into account the NFLPA’s re-formation after 1991. 
Id. at 24–25.  
  During the 2011 lockout, the NFL owners filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB 
pursuant to the NLRA. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 10, Brady, 644 F.3d 661 (No. 11-1898); 
Judy Battista, N.F.L. Claims Union Is Not Bargaining in Good Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at 
B14; see also 29 U.S.C. 158 (2006). 
305. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (“Nor would it be appropriate for 
us to do so without the detailed views of the Board, to whose ‘specialized judgment’ Congress 
‘intended to leave’ many of the ‘inevitable questions concerning multiemployer bargaining bound to 
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long-established criteria for recognizing a disclaimer in finding that she 
could apply the standard herself.306 However, the NLRB’s Pittsburgh 
Steelers opinion is more than twenty years old and has not been revisited 
in the wake of the high-profile disclaimers in 2011 by the NFL and NBA 
players.307 
The NLRB might very well view the criteria for an unequivocal and 
good-faith disclaimer differently now than it did two decades ago. This 
is especially possible in light of the many media reports about the 
tactical nature of the players’ disclaimers during the 2011 lockouts and 
the circumstances through which both lockouts were resolved.308 The 
NLRB has emphasized the requirement that a disclaimer constitute a 
“sincere abandonment with relative permanency” of bargaining and that 
a “bare statement of disclaimer” is not enough.309 At the same time, the 
NLRB could endorse the reasoning in the Pittsburgh Steelers opinion. 
On one hand, by recognizing such disclaimers as valid, the NLRB risks 
allowing unions to switch from bargaining to antitrust litigation at a 
moment’s notice, potentially undermining the entire collective 
bargaining process. On the other hand, by declining to recognize such 
disclaimers, the NLRB strikes a blow to the principle that workers have 
as much right not to be represented by a union as to be represented.310 
Either way, the extension of the nonstatutory labor exemption would 
allow a court to defer to the NLRB on the validity of a disclaimer, as the 
Court endorsed in Brown, and again help separate deserving antitrust 
claims from the undeserving. 
Finally, by extending the exemption protections for a reasonable time 
following disclaimer, courts would wisely allow the economic pressures 
facing both sides to dictate their ultimate agreement. The billions at 
                                                     
arise in the future.’”). 
306. Brady, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1019, 1021. 
307. In re Pittsburgh Steelers, Inc., Case 6–CA–23143, 1991 WL 144468, at *1 (June 26, 1991). 
308. The NFL players reportedly agreed to decertify days before the expiration of the CBA. Judy 
Battista, Sides Seeking Leverage Before Deadline in N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, at SP1. 
Other reports suggested the tactical nature of the players’ disclaimer: “[U]nion leaders say they 
would decertify simply as a way to get players back on the field and to prevent a work stoppage that 
threatens the 2011 season.” See Battista, supra note 182. 
309. See supra notes 144–49. 
310. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (“Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such 
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership 
in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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stake each season in professional sports is simply staggering: the Brady 
plaintiffs estimated NFL revenues at $8.5 billion annually;311 the 
Anthony plaintiffs estimated NBA revenues at nearly $4 billion 
annually.312 Professional athletes, meanwhile, can ill afford to lose a full 
season of salary given the brevity of their careers.313 In light of these 
factors, courts should appreciate the incentive for both sides to return to 
the bargaining table, no matter how frustrated their negotiations. In 
2011, even before the Eighth Circuit heard oral arguments concerning 
the NFL owners’ appeal, the owners and players had resumed 
negotiations.314 After the court issued its decision, the owners and 
players went so far as to issue a joint statement expressing “mutual 
recognition that this matter must be resolved through negotiation” and 
commitment to playing a full season.315 The NFL acknowledged in its 
brief to the Eighth Circuit that for all the fears of a lost season, “there is 
no reason to assume that [a season will be lost], particularly with the 
powerful economic incentive for both sides to come to a 
compromise.”316 The NBA, meanwhile, faced pressure from its 
television partners, who pay a combined $1 billion a season to broadcast 
games.317 
Perhaps because of these economic incentives, courts have expressed 
strong reluctance to hear such cases in the first place.318 As Judge Kermit 
Bye of the Eighth Circuit told the NFL owners and players: “We will 
take this case and render a decision in due course. We won’t, I might 
also say, be all that hurt that you’re leaving us out if you should go out 
                                                     
311. See Brady Complaint, supra note 1, at 13. 
312. See Anthony Complaint, supra note 1, at 10. 
313. See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (D. Conn. 1977) (“The 
career of a professional athlete is more limited than that of persons engaged in almost any other 
occupation. Consequently the loss of even one year of playing time is very detrimental.”). 
314. See Battista, supra note 221. In an interview after oral arguments, Paul Clement said, 
“There’s no question that to the extent what’s going on is continuing negotiations, what that 
underscores is that the union has not disappeared forever.” Battista, supra note 221. Clement added, 
“Everybody can make their own judgment, but the problem with the argument is that it assumes the 
union is gone forever, and I don’t think many people who are students of this game or students of 
this industry really believe that is a fact.” Battista, supra note 221. 
315. See Judy Battista, Court Rules Lockout by N.F.L. Can Go On, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2011, at 
D5. 
316. See Opening Brief for Appellant at 58, Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1898), 2011 WL 2003085. 
317. See Amy Chozik, Basketball in Doubt, TV Tries to Fill a Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, 
at B3. During the lockout, one cable channel had to substitute episodes of CSI: Crime Scene 
Investigation for previously scheduled games. Id. 
318. See Battista, supra note 221. 
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and settle the case.”319 Judge Bye added that if the court did reach a 
decision: “[T]hat’s probably something both sides are not going to like, 
but at least it will be a decision.”320 By recognizing a disclaimer as 
terminating the bargaining relationship only after a reasonable period, 
courts would avoid overriding the economic pressures facing each side 
to reach agreement—while avoiding entering cases they have expressed 
reluctance to hear in the first place. 
For owners and players in professional sports, the economic interests 
at stake are so significant that they caution a court not to overreach in 
evaluating antitrust claims and the extent of the nonstatutory labor 
exemption. Extending the nonstatutory labor exemption for a reasonable 
period following disclaimer—such as the year or one business cycle the 
NFL owners advocated—would prevent such overreaching. As one 
commentator noted following resolution of the NFL lockout, the sides 
reached agreement not because of antitrust litigation but through 
bargaining—”reluctant bargaining, but bargaining nonetheless.”321 
CONCLUSION 
With the Eighth Circuit leaving the question unresolved, the NFL and 
NBA lockouts failed to answer whether a disclaimer of representation 
terminates the bargaining relationship and extinguishes the nonstatutory 
labor exemption’s antitrust protections. The Supreme Court expressed in 
Brown that “extreme outer boundaries” exist such that the exemption 
will not shield employers from antitrust liability indefinitely. However, 
the Court also expressed its significant concern about destabilizing the 
bargaining process. The prospect of allowing players’ unions to disclaim 
representation and immediately file antitrust suits, such as the NFL and 
NBA players did during the 2011 lockouts, threatens the stability of the 
bargaining process that was of such concern in Brown. 
Accordingly, courts considering future disclaimers of representation 
should find that nonstatutory labor exemption protections will continue 
to shield employers for a reasonable period following disclaimer. A 
reasonable period should be defined as one year or one business cycle. 
Such an extension would avoid compromising the bargaining process 
while allowing courts to better distinguish deserving plaintiffs from 
                                                     
319. Id. 
320. See id.  
321. See Lester Munson, NFL Lockout Question: Was it Worth it? ESPN.COM, July 26, 2011, 
http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/page/munson-110725/nfl-lockout-settlement-
questions-answers. 
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those using antitrust law exclusively as a bargaining tactic.322 An 
extension additionally would allow courts to delay ruling on the 
contested antitrust issues and allow the NLRB to consider the 
effectiveness of a disclaimer while avoiding judicial overreaching in 
labor disputes where the billions of dollars at stake in a single season are 
most likely to shape the ultimate resolution between owners and players. 
 
                                                     
322. As previously noted, a union that wanted to expedite its antitrust claims could opt for formal 
decertification. The Supreme Court endorsed formal decertification in Brown as an outer boundary 
for the nonstatutory labor exemption. See supra note 300. 
